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NOTES
FEDERAL REGULATION AND LEGISLATION
IN THE WAKE OF THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
MELTDOWN: A LEGAL PHILOSOPHICAL
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
RESPONSES TO MARKET BUBBLES
Joshua Wirth *
PREAMBLE

David A. Schmudde‡
The regulatory environment surrounding subprime mortgages,
workouts and foreclosures and bank liquidity is constantly changing.
For example, Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain
(R-AZ) has recently announced a plan implementing proposals formally
touted by Democratic primary candidate Senator Hillary Clinton (DNY). 1 Proposed legislation that would allow bankruptcy judges to alter
the terms of subprime mortgages, essentially dead in Congress as of the
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1. See McCain-Palin 2008, Immediate Relief for American Families – HOME
plan, http://www.johnmccain.com/Issues/JobsforAmerica/relief.htm (last visited Oct.
22, 2008) (discussing McCain’s plan to require “participating lenders to forgive part of
the loan principal and then write a new loan that would be backed by the federal
government . . . .”); infra Part II.D.
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spring of 2008, regained new life and was in contention for inclusion in
the bailout package passed this fall. 2
As regulation continues to develop, scholarly debate concerning the
federal government’s responses is ongoing. Yet, while underscoring the
federal government’s responses, the legal philosophies discussed herein
have seldom been explicitly mentioned in the scholarly analyses to date.
Thus, in discussing the legal philosophical bases of the federal
government’s proposed regulations and legislation, this Note brings to
the forefront important considerations which so far have been absent in
scholarly commentary and public press.
INTRODUCTION
“You only learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes
out – and what we are witnessing at some of our largest financial
institutions is an ugly sight.” 3 Given the losses tied to subprime mortgages 4 by top U.S. financial institutions, 5 few could argue the cogency of
these words in Warren Buffett’s annual letter to the shareholders of
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. on March 8, 2008. 6 Perhaps “ugly” was even
an understatement: Bear Stearns Cos., once the fifth largest investment
bank, 7 saw its share price drop from a 52-week high above $156 to a
stock-for-stock acquisition price by J.P. Morgan valued at just $2 per
share. 8
Faced with a “credit crunch” causing the collapse of Bear Stearns 9
and widespread fear that other U.S. financial institutions may soon
follow, a decline in wealth for American households for the first time
since 2002 10 and economists’ claims of recession, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Fed”) reacted in the
Spring of 2008 by cutting the cost of short-term borrowing to add
liquidity to the global financial market. 11 In direct response to the
securities losses tied to subprime mortgages, the Fed also issued changes
to Regulation Z, a federal regulation governing home mortgages. 12
Further, home value depreciation and mounting foreclosures on homes
owned by subprime borrowers prompted federal legislation to reform the
U.S. residential mortgage lending industry. 13 In addition to supporting
the proposed legislation, former Democratic presidential primary candi2. Sarah Lueck et al., Bailout Plan Rejected, Markets Plunge, Forcing New
Scramble to Solve Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30 2008, at A1; infra Part II.C.
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dates Hillary Clinton and President-elect Barack Obama vowed to allocate future federal funds to help owners who are unable to make the
monthly payments on their subprime mortgage loans. 14
From an economic standpoint, debate among politicians and
3. Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders (Feb.
2008), at 3, available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf.
4. Subprime borrowers generally have credit profiles that may include one or
more of the following: (1) multiple delinquencies in payments in the previous 12-24
months, (2) a judgment, charge-off, repossession or foreclosure, (3) bankruptcy, (4) “a
credit bureau risk score (FICO) of 660 or below (depending on the product/collateral),
or other bureau or proprietary scores with an equivalent default probability likelihood,”
or (5) total minimum monthly debt payments greater than 50% of gross income. Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interagency Guidance on Subprime Lending,
Bulletin BL 99-10 (Mar. 1, 1999), at 3, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boardDocs/SRletters/2001/sr0104a1.pdf.
5. For an overview of the losses experienced by U.S. financial institutions due to
investments in subprime mortgages, see infra Part I.
6. See Gordon T. Anderson, Buffett Speaks, CNNMoney.com, Mar. 8, 2004,
http://money.cnn.com/2004/03/06/pf/buffett_letter/index.htm (providing a brief summary of Buffet’s letter and confirming the date of release).
7. See Kate Kelly, et al., Fed Races to Rescue Bear Stearns In Bid to Steady
Financial System, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2008, at A1.
8. Robin Sidel, et al., J.P. Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, As Fed Widens Credit
to Avert Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at A1. Morgan Stanley later increased its
bid to near $10 per share. Andrew Ross Sorkin, JPMorgan Raises Bid for Bear Stearns
to $10 a Share, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/03/24/business/24deal-web.html.
9. The sudden collapse of Bear Stearns resulted in what many investors
considered a “fire sale.” See Sidel, supra note 8.
10. Total wealth of American households slipped approximately $533 billion in the
fourth quarter of 2007 to $57.7 trillion, the first drop since 2002. Sudeep Reddy & Sara
Murray, Housing, Bank Troubles Deepen, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at A1, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120485071664018195.html.
11. For an analysis of the Federal Reserve’s role in the sale of Bear Stearns and its
actions following the sale, see Bob Davis, et al., U.S. Mulls Next Steps in Crisis, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120580840784
044347.html; Greg Ip & Greg Hitt, Mortgage Securities Back Fed Loan to Bear
Stearns, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2008, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
120709943050782205.html; Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Officials Say They Sought
to Avoid Bear Bailout, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB120722972567886357.html?mod=hpp_us_whats_news.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See infra Part II.D.
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scholars concerning the degree to which the federal government should
respond to dramatic changes occurring in the financial marketplace has
been robust. 15 This Note seeks to approach the question from a different
angle, addressing the federal government’s response from a legal
philosophical perspective. Further, while this Note will not address the
issue of preemption, a parallel debate concerning preemption and state
versus federal regulation of mortgage lending standards is ongoing. 16
Part I of this Note will summarize the extent of the blow sustained
thus far by financial institutions and investors brought about by
subprime mortgage defaults. Part II.A will then list the steps taken by
the executive administration under President George W. Bush and
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Jr. to increase regulation of the
residential mortgage lending industry. Part II.B will discuss the steps

15. See, e.g., Scannell & Reddy, supra note 12; David Wessel, Ten Days that
Changed Capitalism, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.
com/public/article/SB120657397294066915-kps7JpgtZ94AzNLCc8q064xrf9s_200903
27.html. For analysis of the “moral hazard” issue featured by Scannell & Reddy, see
infra Part III.A.
16. See, e.g., G. Marcus Cole, Markets and the Law: Protecting Consumers From
Consumer Protection: Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 2006-07 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 251, 252
(2006 /2007) (“The central issue was whether federalism demanded that a state be
permitted to continue to impose regulations on a state mortgage lender, including
visitation, when a national bank acquires the state mortgage lender, or whether such
state regulation was now preempted by federal law.”); Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y.
Yazback, City Governments and Predatory Lending, 34 Fordham Urb. L.J. 757 (2007)
(discussing city efforts to regulate predatory lending pursuant to state laws and federal
regulations); Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream:
Predatory Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev.
1303 (2006) (examining the preemption debate, particularly in the context of federally
supported lenders); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding
Exportation Doctrine and Its Effects on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 Minn. L.
Rev. 518, 520 (2004) (“Assuming the consumer credit market requires some statutory
regulation, are state or federal laws more effective?”). See Eric C. Bartley, Comment,
. . . And Federal Regulation for All: Federally Regulating the Mortgage Banking
Industry, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 477, 478, for an overview of federal acts regulating
mortgage lending practices and standards. See also Richard Cowden, 90 BUREAU
NAT’L AFF. 291 (Feb. 18, 2008), (“The OCC [Office of the Comptroller of Currency]
issued regulations in 2004 asserting that it has preemptive jurisdiction over certain
mortgage lending consumer protections as they apply to national banks and their
operating subsidiaries. The agency has successfully fought off litigation by states that
have challenged the OCC’s preemptive powers . . . .”).
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the Fed has taken under Chairman Ben Bernanke. 17 Part II.C will compare several proposed bills under review by Congress as of the spring of
2008 and Part II.D will discuss plans for increased federal aid by Clinton
and Obama. Finally, by analyzing the federal government’s responses
under widely-recognized legal philosophies, Part III will argue that
valuable and necessary considerations may thus far have been overlooked in the public debate concerning what the federal government
should do to stem foreclosures and ease the subprime fallout.
I. THE EXTENT OF THE SUBPRIME FALLOUT
On October 4, 2006, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Fed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”), the
Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union Administration (together, the “Agencies”) issued the Interagency Guidance on
Non-Traditional Mortgage Products (the “2006 Guidance”). 18 Recognizing the possibility of increased risk of mortgage defaults due to the
growing popularity of “Nontraditional Mortgage Loans,” 19 the 2006
Guidance required greater interest rate and principal amount underwriting standards for those kinds of mortgages. Although the Agencies
acknowledged that several of the comments they received in response to
their initial draft of the 2006 Guidance – including those from several
community and consumer organizations, banks, and financial industry
associations – unambiguously indicated that reduced documentation
loans 20 should not be offered to subprime borrowers, 21 the Agencies
17. This part will be limited to regulations explicitly addressed as responses to
subprime mortgage lending. To the extent that the problems spurring from U.S. subprime mortgage lending have contributed to a global credit crisis, broader efforts by the
Fed to add liquidity and lower short-term interest rates and a broader increase in
regulatory oversight of financial markets in general largely fall outside the scope of this
Note.
18. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg.
58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006).
19. The Guidance defined nontraditional mortgage loans “as ‘interest-only’ mortgages where a borrower pays no loan principal for the first few years of the loan and
‘payment option’ adjustable-rate mortgages (“ARMs”) where a borrower has flexible
payment options with the potential for negative amortization.” Id. at 58,613.
20. “Reduced documentation loans” refers to the practice of underwriting a
mortgage loan based on a level of income and/or financial assets that is stated on the
application but not duly verified or documented, id. at 58,611.
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largely ignored the advice and specifically “declined to provide
guidance recommending reduced documentation loans be limited to any
particular set of circumstances.” 22 As the ensuing year illustrated, however, the 2006 Guidance was insufficient to quell the Agencies’ fears
concerning popular, yet risky, mortgage practices.
Fueled by the same fears as in 2006, the Agencies next published
the Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending 23 on June 29, 2007 (the
“2007 Statement”), addressing risks associated with lending adjustable
rate mortgages (“ARMs”) to subprime borrowers. The Agencies stated
that ARMs offered to subprime borrowers typically have one or more of
the following characteristics: (1) “[l]ow initial payments based on a
fixed introductory rate that expires after a short period and then adjusts
to a variable index rate plus a margin for the remaining term of the
loan,” (2) “[v]ery high or no limits on how much the payment amount or
the interest rate may increase,” (3) “[l]imited or no documentation of
borrowers’ income,” (4) “[p]roduct features likely to result in frequent
refinancing to maintain an affordable monthly payment,” and (5)
“[s]ubstantial prepayment penalties and/or prepayment penalties that
extend beyond the initial fixed interest rate period.” 24 The 2007
Statement reiterated the enhanced underwriting guidelines of the 2006
Guidance and further instructed lenders: “Stated income and reduced
documentation loans to subprime borrowers should be accepted only if
there are mitigating factors that clearly minimize the need for direct
verification of repayment capacity.” 25 The Agencies’ 2006 Guidance
and 2007 Statement proved to be too little, too late.
By the end of 2007, a group of twenty-eight of the largest financial
institutions participating in the secondary mortgage market had written
down $132.6 billion from their balance sheets due to losses in investments tied to U.S. mortgages. 26 The delinquency rate for home loans

21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Fed. Res. Sys. Docket No. OP-1278, available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20070629a1.pdf.
24. Id. at 9-10.
25. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). “Mitigating factors” include “substantial” liquid
reserves that are verified by the lender, or when a borrower with favorable payment
performance seeks to refinance an existing mortgage with a new loan of a similar size
and with similar terms, and the borrower’s financial condition has not deteriorated.
26. Credit-Crunch Toll: $133 Billion of CDO, MBS Writedowns, ASSET-BACKED
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rose nearly a quarter of a percentage point to 5.82 percent in the fourth
quarter of 2007, its highest mark since 1985. 27 Seemingly every day,
tales of entire neighborhoods succumbing to foreclosures due to this unshakable leech known as “Subprime” flooded the nation’s newspapers. 28
Approximately one out of five subprime loans were past due in the
fourth quarter of 2007 and a devastating 13 percent had already entered
foreclosure proceedings. 29
Perhaps not as emotionally jarring, but equally dismaying, is that
economists’ views forecasting the limit for potential future subprime
losses vary to a wide degree, and seem to be continually changing. 30
One would be hard-pressed to find any authority today willing to
concede that this leech, Subprime, has sucked its last drop of blood.
II. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
A. The Bush Administration: Market Guidance
and Market Encouragement

ALERT, Jan. 18, 2008.
27. See Reddy & Murray, supra note 10.
28. See Gretchen Morgenson & Jonathan D. Glater, Foreclosure Machine Thrives
on Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, at BU, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/03/30/business/30mills.html (citing a study by RealtyTrac that found 225,000 U.S.
homes in foreclosure as of the end of February 2008, up 60 percent from a year earlier).
I also credit Ms. Morgenson with associating subprime mortgage losses with the
characteristics of a leech, although I am not sure if she was the first to coin the term.
29. Id.
30. Compare Janet Morrissey, How Bad Will the Mortgage Crisis Get?, TIME, Feb.
19, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1714725,00.
html (citing analyst Bose George with a prediction of $250 billion in total losses and
Columbia University Professor Charles Calomiris estimate of between $300 and $400
billion), and Rick Chung & Sonia Persaud, Foreword: A Year of Uncertainty and
Turmoil – Overview of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Its Effects in the Markets,
Special Edition Subprime 2007, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS – BANKING & FINANCE 2
(estimating that future losses could reach $300 billion), with Greg Ip, Study Finds Wider
Impact of Mortgage Losses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2008, at A2, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120433882809904921.html?mod=rss_whats_news_us_
business (citing a study conducted by David Greenlaw of Morgan Stanley, Jan Hatzius
of Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Anil Kashyap of the University of Chicago and Hyun
Song Shin of Princeton University which estimates futures losses of approximately
$400 billion).

186

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIV

In the spring of 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and
President George W. Bush were the strongest advocates for the position
that the federal government should allow the market to correct itself,
consistently warning against the consequences of over-regulation. 31
Their primary concern, which they both reiterated constantly throughout
the fall of 2007, was that “[a] federal bailout of lenders would only encourage a recurrence of the problem. It’s not the government’s job to
bail out speculators, or those who made the decision to buy a home they
knew they could never afford.” 32 The President summarized steps he
encouraged, which included (1) short term changes to the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) allowing “qualified borrowers who are
delinquent because of an interest rate reset the opportunity to refinance
into an FHA-insured mortgage,” 33 (2) reforming the federal tax code to
ensure that homeowners whose mortgages are modified are not taxed for
the forgiven indebtedness, 34 (3) a “foreclosure avoidance initiative”
offering foreclosure counseling and refinancing, and (4) “a variety of
31. George W. Bush, President of the United States of Am., Address to the
Economic Club of New York (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2008/03/print/20080314-5.html (explaining the Bush administrations passage
of a one time tax rebate to induce growth in the U.S. economy and warning against “law
and regulation that will make it harder for the markets to recover – and when they
recover, make it harder for this economy to be robust.”). See Michael M. Phillips &
John D. McKinnon, Bush Warns Congress Over Mortgage Plans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15,
2008, at A2.
32. George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses Homeownership Financing (Aug.
31, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/08/print/20070
831-5.html; see George W. Bush, Bush Blasts Congress for Not Doing More for
Homeowners, WASHINGTON WIRE: WSJ.COM (Dec. 6, 2007), http://blogs.wsj.com/wash
wire/2007/12/06/bush-blasts-congress-for-not-doing-more-for-homeowners/.
33. However, eligibility requirements, such as the borrower needing some equity in
the property, have limited the program. See Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, 122 Stat.
613, § 202 (temporarily increasing the maximum limitation for FHA loans); Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Res., Speech At the Independent Community Bankers
of America Annual Convention (March 4, 2008), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080304a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke ICB
Speech]. Additional FHA modernization bills have been passed by the House and
proposed in the Senate. See Security Against Foreclosures and Education Act of 2008,
110 S. 2734 (proposed in the Senate March 7, 2008); Expanding American
Homeownership Act of 2007, 110 H.R. 1852 (passed in the House on September 18,
2007).
34. See Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142, 121
Stat. 1803 (2007).
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actions to make the mortgage industry more transparent, more reliable
and more fair . . . .” 35
In October 2007, President Bush’s administration, led by Secretary
Paulson, launched the HOPE NOW Alliance, consisting of mortgage
servicers (companies who accept mortgage payments and eventually
distribute them to investors), lenders, and other participants in the
mortgage market. 36 The mission of HOPE NOW is to find ways for
homeowners who want to stay in their homes avoid foreclosure. 37 The
number of participants in the alliance grew to 94 percent of the subprime
mortgage servicing market, and Paulson subsequently announced an
additional initiative, Project Lifeline, specifically targeting foreclosure
avoidance. Commentators’ immediate responses to the industry initiatives were mixed. 38 Still, encouraged by increasing voluntary coalition

35.
36.

See Bush, supra note 32.
See Statement by Sec’y Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Announcement of New Private
Sector Alliance – HOPE NOW, (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases
/hp599.htm [hereinafter Paulson HOPE NOW Speech]. HOPE NOW is “an alliance between counselors, servicers, investors, and other mortgage market participants to maximize outreach efforts to at-risk homeowners and help them stay in their homes.” HOPE
NOW Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.hopenow.com/site_tools/faqs.php.
37. See Paulson HOPE NOW Speech, supra note 36. For a detailed description of
the HOPE NOW streamlined response and metrics tracking the program’s results, see
American Securitization Forum, Streamlined Foreclosure and Loss Avoidance
Framework for Securitized Subprime Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loans, Dec. 6, 2007,
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/FinalASFStatementonStreamline
dServicingProcedures.pdf.
38. Compare Michael M. Phillips et. al., Battle Lines Form Over Mortgage Plan,
Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 2007, at A1 (confirming that many democrats view the HOPE NOW
initiative as not going far enough to help homeowners avoid foreclosure) with Sudeep
Reddy et. al, Some Cry Foul Over Relief Plan for Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4,
2007, at D1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119673435431012677.html?
mod=hps_us_whats_news (“[S]ome would-be homeowners who have been waiting for
house prices to fall say the government proposal would prop up prices, and thus keep
them out of the market.”). See Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Treasury Secretary,
Remarks on Housing and Capital Markets before the New York Society of Securities
Analysts, (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp757.htm (“[HOPE
NOW] has also received the most criticism due to the mistaken perception that it
abrogates contracts. It does not. . . . Servicers will pursue the[ir] contractual obligations by pursuing all loss-mitigation options when it is in the best interest of investors,
as they normally would. Investors are part of this industry-wide solution . . . .”).
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by market participants, Secretary Paulson continued to warn against
overreaching regulation. 39
B. The Fed: Proposed Amendments to Regulation Z
As the evidence of the scope of the fallout from subprime mortgage
loan defaults continued to mount in the fall of 2007, the Fed announced
its intention to actively mitigate losses.40 In November 2007, it identified several causes of the subprime fallout, including: unemployment; 41
loosening of underwriting standards; the originate-to-distribute model
enabled by investors purchasing securities backed by subprime
mortgages in the secondary market; 42 resets on adjustable rate subprime

39. See Comments by Secretary Paulson on Economy and Housing, Feb. 28, 2008,
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp847.htm (“Homeowners who gambled in the
housing market and viewed their purchase as a short term investment may choose to
walk away. Those who do this are nothing more than speculators, and they are not the
focus of our efforts.”).
40. See Randall S. Kroszner, Speech At the Consumer Bankers Association 2007
Fair Lending Conference, (Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/kroszner20071105a.htm [hereinafter Fair Lending Conf. Speech]
(“These circumstances call for high degree of collaboration and innovation to identify
solutions that can keep borrowers confronting foreclosure in their homes. . . . It is
imperative that we work together as a financial services community to look for ways to
help borrowers address their mortgage challenges . . . .”); see also Kroszner, Speech At
the American Securitization Forum 2008 Conference, (Feb. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20080204a.htm [hereinafter
ASF Conf. Speech] (stating the Fed’s aim to protect subprime mortgage borrowers and
preserve borrower choice).
41. Kroszner, Fair Lending Conf. Speech, supra note 40.
42. Id.; Frederic S. Mishkin, Speech At the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum (Feb. 29,
2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin200802
29a.htm; Ben S. Bernanke, Speech at the Women in Housing and Finance Exchequer
Club Joint Luncheon (Jan. 10, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/news
events/speech/bernanke20080110a.htm. A thorough review and analysis of the secondary market for subprime mortgage loans is beyond the scope of this Note. However, an
understanding of the secondary market and its impact on the growth of subprime
mortgages is critical. For an extremely helpful analysis of how securitization of subprime mortgages works and its effect on the interests of market participants see
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007). For views on rating agencies’
roles in structured products, including securities backed by subprime mortgage loans,
see David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory
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mortgage loans; 43 and flawed underwriting standards based on the premise that “house prices would continue to rise rapidly.” 44 Additionally,
Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke noted that the increase in supply of
homes for sale and subsequent falling home prices limited subprime
borrowers’ ability to avoid foreclosure. 45
In January 2008, the Fed proposed rule changes to Regulation Z 46
(“Reg Z”), which implements federal legislation already governing the
mortgage market, including the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) 47 and
the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”). 48 The
proposed Reg Z amendments seek to: (1) protect borrowers from
“unfair, abusive, or deceptive lending and servicing practices while
preserving responsible lending and sustainable homeownership”; (2)
ensure that mortgage advertisements “provide accurate and balance
information and do not contain misleading or deceptive representations”;
and (3) provide consumers who are purchasing or refinancing homes
with “transaction-specific disclosures early enough to use while
shopping for a mortgage.” 49 To achieve these aims, the proposed amend-

Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985
(2006).
43. Bernanke, supra note 42.
44. Id.
45. Bernanke ICB Speech, supra note 33.
46. 12 C.F.R § 226 (2003).
47. 15 U.S.C § 1601 (2001).
48. Riegle Community Development & Regulation Information Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994).
49. 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1672 (Jan. 9, 2008); see Bernanke, Speech At the National
Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual Meeting (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http:
//federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080314a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke
NCRC Speech] (“We believe these proposed rules will help protect mortgage borrowers
from unfair and deceptive practices. At the same time, we did not want to create rules
that were so open-ended or costly to administer that responsible lenders would pull out
of the subprime market.”); Kroszner, ASF Conf. Speech, supra note 40 (summarizing
the causes of increased defaults on subprime mortgages and explaining the goals of the
Fed’s changes to Regulation Z); Rick Chung & Sonia Persaud, Federal Reserve Board
Proposes Regulations to Curb Unfair or Deceptive Mortgage Lending Practices, 1
Bloomberg Law Reports – Banking & Finance 1, 1, Feb. 2008; see also Sue Kirchhoff
& Noelle Knox, Fed Plan Reins In Dicey Mortgage Loans, USA TODAY, at 3B (Dec.
18,
2007),
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/
2007-12-18-fed-impact_N.htm?csp=34.
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ments outline new standards for higher-priced mortgage loans. 50 If
enacted, the proposed amendments would prohibit a pattern or practice 51
of lending higher-priced mortgage loans without considering the
borrower’s ability to repay. 52 The Fed also proposed new standards
applicable to all mortgages which would limit mortgage broker
compensation, 53 explicitly prohibit coercion by appraisers to inflate
property values, and prohibit certain servicing practices deemed
abusive. 54 Finally, the proposed amendments to Reg Z would create
new standards for advertising mortgage rates and products.55 But, what
would the proposed Reg Z amendments accomplish for Americans who
50. Higher-priced mortgage loans are closed-end home mortgages (not Home
Equity Lines of Credit) with an annual percentage rate (APR) that exceeds the
comparable Treasury security by 3 percent for first-lien loans or 5 percent for subordinate-lien loans. 73 Fed. Reg. at 1680; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Res. System (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20
071218a.htm [hereinafter Fed. Res. Press Release].
51. “Whether a creditor had engaged in the prohibited pattern or practice would
depend on the totality of the circumstances . . . . [T]he Board is not proposing to adopt
a quantitative standard for determining the existence of a pattern or practice.” 73 Fed.
Reg. at 1688.
52. Id. at 1686. Consideration of repayment ability includes the borrower’s current
and reasonably expected income and obligations, employment and assets other than the
collateral used to secure the mortgage. Id.; Chung & Persaud, supra note 49, at 2.
Consideration of repayment ability should extend at least seven years from the time of
origination based on fully-amortizing payments at the fully-indexed rate and income
and assets that have been verified by the lender. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 1689-90; Chung &
Persaud, supra note 49, at 2. The Fed has asked for comment whether lending higherpriced mortgage loans to borrowers with debt-to-income ratios at or above 50 percent
should create a rebuttable presumption that the lender failed to adequately consider the
borrowers ability to repay. 73 Fed. Reg. at 1689. Finally, the proposed amendments
would require automatic property tax and insurance payments into an escrow account
and mandate restrictions on prepayment penalties for higher-priced mortgage loans. Id.
at 1693-98.
53. “The Board proposes to prohibit a creditor from paying a mortgage broker in
connection with a covered transaction unless the payment does not exceed an amount
the broker has agreed with the consumer in advance will be the broker’s total
compensation.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 1699. Additionally, brokers would have to disclose that
the consumer is paying for the broker’s compensation even if all or part of the
compensation comes directly from the lender and that the broker’s interest may conflict
with the consumer’s interest. Id.
54. Id. at 1700-03.
55. Id. at 1704-14; Chung & Persaud, supra note 49, at 4-6; Fed. Res. Press
Release, supra note 50.
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are already stuck with a mortgage they cannot afford, or even worse,
already face foreclosure? As Part II.C illustrates, many federal legislators believe that the Fed’s response does absolutely nothing in this
regard.
C. Congress: Reining in Loose Lending Standards
and Stemming the Tide of Foreclosures
Federal legislators have attacked the responses of both the Fed and
the Bush administration for not going far enough to aid mortgage
borrowers facing foreclosure. In March 2008, Christopher J. Dodd (DCT), Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, asserted, “Put simply, these people need help now – not
just ‘Hope Now.’ Unfortunately, the Administration, whose lax oversight led to this crisis, has put only a flimsy plan in place that fails to
offer enough of either.” 56 Dodd further admonished the Bush administration for offering “only timid measures that have done little to help
families keep their homes or restore confidence to financial markets. It
is time for the Administration to embrace a more comprehensive, bold,
and effective approach that goes to the heart of the current financial
crisis – the mortgage markets.” 57
To address gaps in the federal government’s response, in the spring
of 2008 Dodd announced future legislation unofficially titled The
Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008. 58 The Foreclosure Prevention Act
offered a bolder approach aimed at reforming the FHA by counseling
homeowners facing foreclosure and helping communities deal with local
abandoned or foreclosed properties. 59 Dodd proposed a further expan56. Release from Christopher J. Dodd, U.S. Sen. for Conn., Dodd: Foreclosure
Data Deeply Disturbing (Mar. 6, 2008), http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=Articles.Detail&Article_id=8ff25f26-7ee3-4276-97c7-1e34e41190af&
Month=3&Year=2008.
57. Statement of Christopher J. Dodd, U.S. Sen. for Conn., Dodd Statement on
Markets, Fed Action (Mar. 17, 2008), http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=Articles.Detail&Article_id=47540c2a-9c6a-455e-919a-a032fb6d7255&Month=
3&Year=2008.
58. This is the same title as a bill introduced by Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) on
February 13, 2008. See S. 2636, 110th Cong. (as introduced by Sen. Reid, Feb. 13,
2008). Reid’s proposed bill and Dodd’s forthcoming proposed bill are not identical.
This Part focuses on Dodd’s Foreclosure Prevention Act; however, other proposed
legislation by Reid will be analyzed as well.
59. Christopher J. Dodd, U.S. Sen. for Conn., and Richard Shelby, U.S. Sen. for
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sion of the FHA loan program to a maximum of 110% of the area
median home price or 132% of the Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (GSE)
loan limit, whichever is lower. 60 The Foreclosure Prevention Act also
sought $10 billion for Federal tax-exempt private activity bonds to
refinance subprime loans, $4 billion in Community Development Block
Grant Funds to assist communities hardest hit by foreclosures, $100
million for additional foreclosure avoidance counseling, and further
assistance to homeowners and homebuilders in the form of tax modifications. 61
Echoing Dodd’s call for greater federal government response, 62 in
March 2008 Barney Frank (D-MA), Chairman of the House Committee
on Financial Services, announced the proposed FHA Housing Stabilization & Homeownership Retention Act, 63 providing, according to
Frank’s estimates, sufficient funds to allow the FHA to refinance up to
$300 billion of mortgages on homes at risk of foreclosure. 64 Frank’s bill
would also provide $10 billion in non-recourse, zero-interest loans and
grants to the state for the purchase of vacant and foreclosed homes. 65 It
would require existing lenders to accept “a substantial write-down of
principal,” and that the new FHA loan be one that the borrower can
“reasonably be expected to pay.” 66 Upon the sale of the property or
refinancing of the mortgage, the FHA would be entitled to a minimum
Ala., Dodd, Shelby Announce Bipartisan Housing Stimulus Package (Apr. 2, 2008),
http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/4351.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. “I am pleased that Secretary Paulson and the Administration continue to encourage the private sector to take reasonable steps to minimize foreclosures. Obviously
much more is needed, but I welcome the progress that has been made.” Press Release,
Barney Frank, Chairman of H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Frank Statement on HopeNow
Alliance Announcement (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financial
svcs_dem/press011807.shtml.
63. FHA Housing Stabilization & Homeownership Retention Act of 2008, H.R.
5830, 110th Cong (2008) [hereinafter Housing & Homeownership Act].
64. Press Release, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. Frank Announces New Economic,
Mortgage and Housing Rescue Proposal (Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.house.gov/frank/
fha0308.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
65. The non-recourse, zero-interest loans would be required to go to families with
incomes no greater than 140 percent of the area median income and in the case of
owner-occupied properties the loan must be repaid with two years. Housing &
Homeownership Act, supra note 63.
66. Id.
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exit fee of 3.0 percent of the FHA loan balance. 67 Eligibility for the
FHA mortgage, however, could be limited by the date the mortgage was
obtained, mandatory income documentation on the new FHA mortgage,
and other factors. 68 Frank’s bill would also require additional funds for
new oversight, annual audit, and semi-annual reporting capacity. 69
In assessing the Frank-Dodd FHA Acts, 70 one should certainly
consider the economic impact the legislation could have on mortgage
borrowers who are facing foreclosure, as well as the potential economic
impact on the nation as a whole. Part IV of this Note suggests, however,
that in analyzing the Frank-Dodd FHA Acts and the other responses
summarized in this Part, perhaps the very nature of law in America
requires the federal government’s responses to extend beyond economic
considerations. Should the soundness of the Frank-Dodd FHA Acts be
judged on whether they accomplish a morally just result, even if such a
result comes at a tremendous economic cost? If so, what is the morally
optimal result these and the other federal responses should aim to
achieve? The remainder of this Part will discuss several other federal
responses to the subprime meltdown. Part IV will then attempt to shed
light on these questions.
Taking a forward-looking approach similar to the Fed’s,
Representative Bradley Miller (D-NC) introduced the Mortgage Reform
and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007 71 (the “Miller Act”). The
Miller Act, passed by the House of Representatives on November 15,
2007, sought to significantly expand on the Fed’s amendments to Regulation Z. 72 The Miller Act would: (1) establish a national Mortgage
67. Id. The FHA may be entitled to an additional percentage of profits if the sale
or refinancing occur within five years of origination of the FHA loan.
68. Proposed eligibility criteria included: (1) the property must be a owneroccupied primary residence; (2) the refinanced mortgage must have been originated
between January 1, 2005 and July 1, 2007; (3) the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio must
have been at least 40 percent as of March 1, 2008; (4) existing lenders must write-down
enough to allow a loan loss reserve amount of at least 5 percent for the FHA; (5) FHA
loans must underwritten using the current appraised home values and fully documented
income of the borrower; and (6) no private liens may be subordinated behind the new
FHA loan. Id.
69. Id.
70. I will refer to the proposed FHA legislation by Frank and Dodd as the FrankDodd FHA Acts.
71. H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, Nov. 15, 2007).
72. Chung & Persaud, supra note 49, at 1. H.R. 3915 was passed by the House of
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Licensing System and Registry; 73 (2) impose a minimum duty of care on
all “loan originators” 74 to present to clients mortgages that they have “a
reasonable ability to repay” 75 and that provide a “net tangible benefit”
for borrowers who are refinancing; 76 and (3) establish further restrictions
on all mortgages that are not a “qualified mortgage” 77 or “qualified safe
harbor mortgage.” 78 Mortgages that are not qualified mortgages or qualified safe harbor mortgages would not be allowed to contain prepayment
penalties; nor would originators be permitted to receive or pay, directly
or indirectly, any incentive compensation that is based on or varies with
Representatives on November 15, 2007 and then referred to the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. As of March 29, 2008 no further action on the
bill has been published.
73. Requires all “loan originators,” defined as any person who takes a residential
mortgage application, assists a consumer in the applying for a mortgage, or offers or
negotiates terms of a mortgage for direct or indirect compensation, to first obtain
registration as a loan officer or State-licensed loan originator. Id. §§ 101, 103.
Mandates waiting periods for license renewal following revocation or conviction of a
felony and minimal education requirements for registrants. Id. §§ 104, 129A.
74. See definition cited supra note 73.
75. Id. § 129A(2)(B)(i). Ability to repay shall be based on consideration of duly
verified: (1) credit history, (2) present and reasonably certain future income, (3) debt,
(4) employment, and (5) “other financial resources” other than equity in the home used
as collateral to obtain the mortgage. Id. § 129B(a)(3). Further, a “good faith determination based on verified and documented information” that the borrower has a
reasonable ability to repay the mortgage, plus all applicable taxes, insurance and
assessments, must be based on the mortgage’s “fully indexed rate” and fully amortizing
payments. Id. §§ 129B(a)(1), 129B(a) (4)(D)(iii). “Fully indexed rate” is defined as
prevailing rate plus the margin that will apply after any introductory rate has expired.
Id. § 129B(a)(5).
76. The Fed shall be called upon to proscribe regulations to define the term “net
tangible benefit.” Id. § 129B(b).
77. “Qualified mortgages” are first lien mortgages with a rate less than or equal to:
(1) the yield on a treasury security with a comparable maturity plus 300 basis points, or
(2) the “most recent conventional mortgage rate,” as establish by federal regulation,
plus 175 basis points. Id. § 129B(c)(3). The thresholds listed above are increased by
200 basis points for all subordinate liens. Id.
78. “Qualified safe harbor mortgages” are any residential loans: (1) for which the
borrower’s income is fully documented and verified, (2) underwriting is based on the
“fully indexed rate,” (3) allow no opportunity for negative amortization at time over the
term of the loan, (4) require a fixed payment of principal and interest for at least five
years, (5) have a margin of no greater than 300 basis points over a “single generally
accepted interest rate index” and (6) are issued to borrowers whose proposed debt
coverage ratio does not exceed a threshold to be determined by federal regulators. Id.
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the terms of any mortgage that is not a qualified mortgage. 79 Therefore,
for any mortgage that fails to meet the criteria of a qualified mortgage,
lenders would no longer pay higher commissions to brokers for loans
with higher interest rates. This would eliminate the broker’s interest in
directing the borrower toward a loan with a higher interest rate simply so
that the broker may receive a higher commission from the lender.
Any creditor that is found to violate the Miller Act would be
allowed ninety days to cure. 80 Failure to cure would provide the
borrower with a defense to foreclosure and allow the borrower to bring a
civil action against the creditor with a statute of limitations of three
years for fixed-rate mortgages, or up to six years for adjustable rate
mortgages. 81 However, if the seller or assignor makes representations or
warranties that no mortgages being assigned or securitized are not
qualified mortgages or safe harbor mortgages, liability would not attach
to the assignee or securitizer where they exercise reasonable due diligence in verifying these representations and warranties. 82 The Miller
Act also sought new disclosure requirements and new restrictions on
“high-cost mortgages,” including mandatory pre-loan counseling. 83 The
requested funding for the Miller Act was $160 million spread over five
79.
80.
81.

Id. §§ 129B(f), 129A(b)(1).
Id. § 129B(d)(1)(B).
Civil action could result in the rescission of the loan, plus the borrower’s costs
“as a result of the violation and in connection with obtaining a rescission,” and
reasonable attorney’s fee. Id. at § 129B(e) (describing the borrower’s defense to foreclosure in the event of a violation).
82. Id. § 129B(d).
83. Required disclosures included the rate, monthly mortgage payment and
payment to any escrow account for property taxes and insurance, all settlement charges,
any fees paid to the originator by the borrower and any compensation received by the
originator from the creditor based on the interest rate of the mortgage. Id. § 213. The
Miller Act defined “high cost mortgages” as those which, among other criteria, either:
(1) exceed a rate greater than the yield on a treasury security with a comparable
maturity plus 800 basis points for first lien mortgages or 1000 basis points for
subordinate lien mortgages, (2) the points and fees, including all compensation paid
directly or indirectly to a mortgage broker and prepayment penalties payable under the
loan, associated with the mortgage exceed five percent of the total transaction, or (3)
have prepayment penalties that exceed 36 months in duration or exceed two percent of
the amount prepaid. Id. § 301; Chung & Persaud, supra note 49, at 7, n.8. A creditor
would not be allowed to extend a “high-cost mortgage” to any borrower before
certifying that the borrower has received counseling from an approved mortgage
counselor. Id. § 303.
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years.
On December 12, 2007 Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) introduced the
“Home Ownership Preservation and Protection Act of 2007”84 (the Reid
Act) to the Senate. Similar to the Miller Act, for all “subprime” 85 and
“nontraditional” 86 mortgages, the Reid Act would: (1) create a rebuttable
presumption that a lender failed to make the required reasonable assessment of the borrower’s ability to repay the loan if the proposed total
monthly debt exceeds 45% of the borrower’s monthly gross income; 87
(2) prohibit any prepayment penalty provision; 88 (3) prohibit offering
any compensation directly or indirectly to the originator that varies with
the terms of the loan, including the rate; 89 and (4) require a “net tangible
benefit” to the borrower. 90
Reid, like Miller, sought to eliminate any conflict of interest between the broker and the borrower that could result in the borrower
obtaining a mortgage with a higher interest rate or other non-optimal
terms. The Reid Act would also impose a fiduciary duty on mortgage
brokers for all mortgage loans requiring brokers to “act in the best
interest of the borrower and in the utmost good faith toward the
borrower, and refrain from compromising the rights or interests of the
borrower in favor of the rights or interests of another, including a right
or interest of the mortgage broker . . . .” 91 Further, the Reid Act would
impose a duty on lenders and loan servicers to mitigate losses before
84.
85.

S. 2452, 110th Cong. (2007).
“Subprime mortgage loan” is defined in the Reid Act as a “home mortgage loan
in which the annual percentage rate exceeds the greater of the thresholds determined”
by the Treasury Securities Rate Spread (defined therein) or the Conventional Mortgage
Rate Spread (defined therein). Id. § 2.
86. “Nontraditional mortgage loan” is defined in the Reid Act as a “home mortgage
loan that allows consumers to defer payment of principle or interest.” Id.
87. S. 2452, 110th Cong. § 129A(a) (2007).
88. Id. § 129A(c).
89. Id. § 129A(d). Compensation that varies with the amount of the loan is permissible, however. Id.
90. Id. § 129A(e). “Net tangible benefit” shall be defined by federal regulation.
91. Id. § 129B(b). For all mortgage loans, all mortgage originators shall also “act
in good faith and with fair dealing in any transaction, practice, or course of business in
connection with the originating of any home mortgage loan” and “make reasonable
efforts to secure a home mortgage loan that is appropriately advantageous to the
borrower . . . .” Id. § 129B(a) (emphasis added). In connection with the imposed duties
to act in the borrower’s interests, originators would be required to verify all sources of
the borrower’s income for all mortgage loans. Id. § 129B(d).
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initiating foreclosure. 92 Failure to mitigate losses would constitute a defense to any foreclosure and establishes liability for the lender or loan
servicer of any actual damages plus a reasonable attorney’s fee. 93
Moreover, in contrast with the Miller Act, assignees and holders of
security interests in connection with subprime or nontraditional mortgages would be liable under any action that the borrower may bring against
the creditor or originator for breach of fiduciary duty or failure to mitigate losses. 94 Violation of the Reid Act could result in rescission for up
to six years from the date of consummation and civil liability for up to
three years from consummation. 95 In lieu of rescission, the borrower
would have the option to force the lender, servicer, or assignee to
modify or refinance the mortgage under terms that would not breach the
imposed fiduciary duty at the time of the transaction, plus pay all costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees. 96 Finally, the Reid Act would allow for
transitive liability to lenders for the acts of mortgage brokers. 97 The requested funding for the Reid Act was equal to that of the Miller Act:
$160 million spread over five years. 98
In September 2007, Miller also introduced the Emergency Home
Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act of 2007 (the “Miller
Bankruptcy Act”) to the House of Representatives. 99 The Miller Bankruptcy Act would allow bankruptcy judges to modify certain loans to
subprime homeowners facing foreclosure. 100 Similar legislation was
also introduced in the Senate. 101 However, as of the spring of 2008 the

92. Id. § 129D(h) (“A lender or loan servicer shall not initiate a foreclosure of a
home mortgage loan unless that lender or loan servicer has . . . offered, whenever
feasible, a repayment plan, forbearance, loan modification, or other option to assist the
borrower in bringing his or her delinquent account into arrears.”) (emphasis added).
93. Id. § 129D(h), (j).
94. Id. § 704(f).
95. Id. §§ 702(a), 703(b) and (d).
96. Id. § 705(h).
97. Id. § 707(i). This provision is limited to subprime, nontraditional and “highcost mortgages.” High-cost mortgages are defined in the Reid Act as “consumer credit
transaction[s] that [are] secured by the principle dwelling of a consumer, other than a
reverse mortgage transaction.” Id. § 101.
98. Id. § 901.
99. H.R. 3609, 110th Cong. (2007).
100. Id. § 3.
101. See S. 2133, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 2136, 110th Cong. (2007).
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proposed bankruptcy legislation had not passed the House or the Senate
and did not appear to be gaining much traction in either.
D. Clinton and Obama: Federal Funds to Those Hardest Hit
In the spring of 2008, Democratic presidential primary candidate
Hillary Clinton and President-elect Barack Obama each proposed plans
to help homeowners avoid foreclosure.
Senator Clinton consistently has voiced her intention to allocate
federal funds to help borrowers and local governments avoid foreclosures. 102 Indeed, Clinton has done more than just voice strong support for the Frank-Dodd FHA Acts. On March 24, 2008, she proposed
the immediate appointment of an Emergency Working Group on Foreclosures comprised of non-partisan economists, a ninety-day moratorium
on foreclosures, and new legislation to clarify legal liability for
mortgage servicers who modify subprime loans to help avoid foreclosures. 103 Clinton’s previous plan called on Wall Street banks to adopt
a five-year freeze on interest rates for all subprime mortgages. 104 Her
revised plan, called Protect American Homeowners, did not explicitly
102. See Press Release, Hillary for President, Hillary Clinton Calls on Wall Street to
Shoulder Responsibility for the Foreclosure Crisis (Dec. 5, 2007), http://www.hillary
clinton.com/news/release/view/?id=4532 [hereinafter Clinton Foreclosure Crisis Press
Release] (calling for a Community Support Fund of up to $5 billion to “help hard-hit
communities and distressed homeowners endure the foreclosure crisis . . . .”). Senator
Clinton has since revised that number, and it now stands at a proposed $30 billion in
funds for states and localities “hard hit by this crisis.” Press Release, Hillary for
President, Hillary Clinton Delivers Remarks on Halting the Housing Crisis (Mar. 24,
2008), http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/release/view/?id=6700 [hereinafter Clinton
Housing Crisis Press Release] (“This money could be used to purchase foreclosed or
distressed properties, which cities and states could then resell to low-income families or
convert into affordable rental housing.”); see Press Release, Hillary for President, A
Second Stimulus Package Focused on Housing (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.hillary
clinton.com/news/release/view/?id=6644 [hereinafter Clinton Stimulus Press Release]
(“Senator Clinton’s $30 billion Emergency Housing Fund is designed to administer
funds quickly and effectively to state, local and community groups to stem further
foreclosures and counteract negative economic impacts in these communities.”).
103. Clinton Housing Crisis Press Release, supra note 102.
104. In December 2007, Clinton called on Wall Street to adopt a 90-day foreclosure
moratorium and a five year freeze on the interest rates of subprime adjustable rate mortgages, and to provide status reports on loan modifications. Clinton Foreclosure Crisis
Press Release, supra note 102.
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call for a voluntary five-year rate freeze provision. 105 However, she has
called for legislation ensuring that servicers who modify subprime loans
to avoid foreclosure will not be found liable. This may be an attempt to
push the rate-freeze onto investors who have not been volunteering. I
will refer to Clinton’s responses as the Clinton Plan. 106
Not going as far as Clinton purportedly would, Obama proposed a
plan that “will create a fund to help people refinance their mortgages and
provide comprehensive supports to innocent homeowners.” 107 Obama’s
plan also called for funds to assist homeowners in selling homes that are
“simply too expensive for their income levels.” 108 New disclosure requirements, criminal penalties for mortgage professionals who commit
fraud, and foreclosure counseling for homeowners were also included in
Obama’s plan. 109 Obama would partially pay for his fund by increasing
“penalties on lenders who acted irresponsibly and committed fraud.”110
Obama, however, must therefore assume that such lenders will still be
solvent when his plan goes into effect. Further, any remaining funds
necessary to implement his plan were not expressly accounted for as of
the spring of 2008.
III. A LEGAL PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS: TOO FAR OR NOT FAR ENOUGH?
Senator Clinton has been one of the loudest proponents of the
105. See Press Release, Hillary for President, Hillary Clinton’s Plan to Protect
American Homeowners (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/release/
view/?id=6691.
106. Clinton Foreclosure Crisis Press Release, supra note 102. (“If Wall Street does
not voluntarily agree to the three-step plan, and the crisis builds, Hillary will consider
legislation that offers protection to mortgage servicers and others who work with
borrowers to modify their mortgages.”).
107. BarackObama.com, Barack Obama’s Economic Agenda: Keeping America’s
Promise, http://obama.3cdn.net/8f478c5e1bb07ca0b1_sh1umv2zy.pdf [hereinafter
Obama Economic Agenda] (last visited Mar. 29, 2008); BarackObama.com, Protecting
Homeownership & Cracking Down on Mortgage Fraud, http://www.barackobama.com/
pdf/MortgageFactSheet.pdf [hereinafter Obama Protecting Homeownership] (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
108. Obama Economic Agenda, supra note 107; Obama Protecting Homeownership,
supra note 107.
109. Obama Economic Agenda, supra note 107; Obama Protecting Homeownership,
supra note 107.
110. Obama Economic Agenda, supra note 107; Obama Protecting Homeownership,
supra note 107.
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Dodd-Frank FHA Bills. 111 According to Clinton, that legislation “is not
a bailout. It is a sensible way for all actors – lenders, investors, servicers
and borrowers – to share responsibility, keep families in their homes and
stabilize our communities and our economy.” 112 Clinton rejected the
most common reason for disapproval of the federal government’s
responses thus far – the fear of moral hazard stemming from a government bailout of market participants who bet wrong. Part III.A will flesh
out the moral hazard argument further. The remaining sections of Part
III will then illustrate that if the debate over the federal government’s
responses is limited to the issue of economic moral hazard in the future,
a failure to consider valuable and well-developed theories of what the
law is, and what the law ought to achieve, may result.
A. Moral Hazard and Market Efficiency
According to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, when the government
“overly interferes” with the marketplace, there is a potential for:
[a] so-called moral hazard that can affect future economic decisions
and transactions. It is very plausible to suggest that if the
government bails everyone out of this mess, that we will continue to
bail out bad actors in the future, and any market discipline that
113
currently remains will further erode.

Bernanke’s has been one of the loudest voices warning that
government intervention may lead to moral hazard. 114
111. See, e.g., Press Release, Hillary for President, Hillary Clinton Announces
Support for New Action on the Housing Crisis (Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.hillaryclin
ton.com/news/release/view/?id=6515 [hereinafter Clinton New Action Press Release];
Clinton Housing Crisis Press Release, supra note 102; Press Release, Hillary for
President, Clinton Calls For Bold Action To Halt Housing Crisis (Mar. 24, 2008),
http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/release/view/?id=6693.
112. Clinton New Action Press Release, supra note 111.
113. The Near-Term Economic Outlook For The U.S. Economy: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 20 (2008) (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Fed. Res. Bd.).
114. See, e.g., id. (“It’s not our intention – either as a central bank or as a regulator –
to protect those who made mistakes from the consequences of those mistakes.”);
Bernanke ICB Speech, supra note 33 (“Concerns about fairness and the need to
minimize moral hazard add to the complexity of the issue; we want to help borrowers in
trouble, but we do not want borrowers who have avoided problems through responsible
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In fact, moral hazard may be presented as a counter-argument to
every congressional bill proposed to help subprime borrowers.
Economist David C. John 115 has criticized the Frank-Dodd FHA Bills
for creating a moral hazard by eliminating consequences for poor
lending practices, forcing taxpayers to pay for increases in future FHA
mortgage defaults, rewarding homeowners who made speculative
investments, and creating the perception that “it is acceptable to renege
on an obligation because a government buyout will cut your losses.” 116
John claims that all legislation that has been proposed to date would
create moral hazard; Congress should resist the pressure to “do
something” and instead allow the market to correct itself. 117
Analysis of potential moral hazard tends to be largely economic in
nature, with the promotion of market efficiency as the primary
objective. 118 Scholars present arguments for more or less government
regulation based on efficiency grounds. On the one hand, greater regulation may increase efficiency by deterring fraud and misleading trading
practices, redistributing information more evenly across market participants, and creating compulsory disclosure duties. 119 Promoting market
efficiency and maintaining market integrity have been key motivating
factors in the Fed’s response to subprime mortgage losses.120
financial management to feel that they are being unfairly penalized.”).
115. David C. John – Staff Page, http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/DavidJohn.
cfm.
116. See David C. John, Frank-Dodd Approach Won’t Fix the Mortgage Mess, The
Heritage Foundation, Mar. 24, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Economy/wm18
65.cfm.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Varouk A. Aivazian et al., The Law of Contract Modifications: The
Uncertain Quest for a Benchmark of Enforceability, in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTRACT LAW 201-06 (Victor P. Goldberg ed., 1989) (government intervention in
private contracts allows parties “to realize the static efficiency gains from recontracting
relative to breach, [and] creates long-run or dynamic efficiency losses as a result of the
attenuation of incentives to efficient risk reduction or insurance, as well as generating
transaction cost on recontracting.”).
119. HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 279; see JULES L. COLEMAN,
MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 68 (1988) (“Normative law-and-economics is the
home of reformers. Existing legal rules are evaluated and new ones fashioned in terms
of their economic efficiency.”).
120. See Kroszner, Speech At the American Securitization Forum 2008 Conference
(Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20080204a.
htm [hereinafter ASF Conf. Speech] (“Protecting borrowers with responsible under-
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Yet, efficiency arguments are also used in opposition to bright-line
regulations that restrict markets, such as requiring documentation of
income and minimum debt-to-income ratios. 121 Firms may modify
contracts on their own rather than attempt to rely on the precise terms
originally bargained for due to concerns about their reputation, making
government regulation unnecessary. 122 Accordingly, many argue that
the government should step back and allow markets to fix themselves
through firm-initiated approaches, such as the HOPE NOW alliance, 123
adding that increased regulation will only prolong losses and market
inefficiency. 124
In Parts III.B, III.C and III.D, this Note will assess whether the economic moral hazard and market efficiency inquiry disregards necessary
considerations in determining how the federal government should
respond to the subprime mortgage meltdown.
B. The Economic Approach to Law: Efficiency is King
For followers of the Economic Approach, the efficiency analysis
independently satisfies the inquiry into what the law is and what the law
should be. According to Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Richard Posner:
The rules assigning property rights and determining liability, the
procedures for resolving legal disputes, the constraints imposed on law
enforcers, methods of computing damages and determining the
availability of injunctive relief – these and other important elements of
the legal system can best be understood as attempts, though rarely

writing standards also protects the integrity and proper functioning of the mortgage
market by increasing investor confidence.”); Bernanke ICB Speech, supra note 33 (“A
major thrust of our efforts is sharing relevant and timely data analysis of mortgage
delinquencies with community groups and policymakers to efficiently target resources
to areas most in need.”); Bernanke NCRC Speech, supra note 49 (summarizing the
Fed’s “community affairs” effort to stem foreclosures by providing research, data
analysis and contact information to local organizations).
121. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 119, at 176 (“[T]he efficient and efficacious implementation of regulation against unfairness and unjust power relations in contracts
tends to require more open-ended standards.”).
122. See Collins, supra note 119, at 174.
123. See John, supra note 116.
124. The Bush administration championed this view throughout 2007 and the spring
of 2008. See supra Part II.A and corresponding footnotes.
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acknowledged as such, to promote an efficient allocation of resources. 125
Posner asserts that most areas of law, including common law and
statutory fields, are driven by a consistent economic logic. 126 This Note
does not seek to evaluate the adequacy of Posner’s philosophy of law. It
does assert, however, that those who use economic efficiency grounds as
the basis for their attacks or defenses of the federal responses must
explicitly align themselves with Posner’s Economic Approach. To the
best of my knowledge, this step has not been taken in the scholarly
analyses to date. The remainder of this Note will examine whether the
public debate has thus far overlooked several fundamental questions in
determining the degree to which the federal government should respond
to the subprime crisis.
C. Legal Formalism: Certainty and the Bedrock
Principal of Freedom of Contract
The philosophy of law known as Legal Formalism promotes the
theory that clear rules let parties know where they stand, thereby
allowing for planning by market participants and expeditious dispute
resolution. 127 Market participants seek maximum certainty under the
law, “so that it should be clear when a binding contract has been made,
and what precise obligations have been incurred.” 128 Legal philosopher
Lon Fuller claims that laws promoting certainty and autonomy in private
contract are natural results of human social interaction. 129 Fuller further
states, “This is particularly true in the area of commercial transactions
where repetitive dealings tend to create standardized expectations.” 130
125. Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, in
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE LAW: THE COLLECTED ECONOMIC ESSAYS OF
RICHARD A. POSNER VOLUME ONE 44, (Fancesco Parisi ed., 2000) (citing Ehrlich &
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974)).
126. See id. at 45.
127. See Collins, supra note 119, at 175.
128. Id.
129. See Lon L. Fuller, The Role of Contract in the Ordering Processes of Society
Generally, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 173-74 (Kenneth I. Winston
ed., 1981) (“In confronting perplexities of this sort there is a natural tendency for the
mind to seek out simplistic formulas that will shape our language, and with it our
thought, in ways offering some reassurance that things are not, after all, utterly chaotic
or so complicated as to be inaccessible to analysis.”).
130. Id. at 176.
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Even under a strictly Formalist system of law, the losing parties in
any dispute may claim that the government has treated them unfairly by
adjudicating against them under authority of a rule or law that, while
purportedly formal, did not give sufficient notice that their actions were
unlawful. As Fuller points out, “the disadvantaged applicant will feel
that government has cheated on its own rules while the allocative agency
will conceive of itself as discharging a function that simply cannot be
rule-bound but requires a broad discretion to meet shifting contingencies
and changed conditions.” 131 But, Fuller continues, a shift in contingencies or change in circumstances ultimately enforces the notion that “the
lawgiver is properly regarded as promising to judge the citizen’s actions
by rules he has announced in advance as governing those actions.” 132
Therefore, one may consider how the proposed federal responses rank in
creating clear rules that, announced in advance, enforce the expectations
of the various parties in the subprime mortgage market.
Under a Legal Formalist philosophy, opponents of the discussed
federal government responses may claim that the proposed legislation
and regulation would introduce an unacceptable level of uncertainty into
the mortgage market. This uncertainty would derive from various
sources, including the creation of (1) “reasonable” standards, 133 (2)
duties to act in “good faith,” 134 (3) rebuttable presumptions, 135 and (4)
rate freezes. 136 Thus, proponents of Legal Formalism would argue that,
regardless of whether these indeterminates are economically efficient,
the federal government’s responses stray from what the law should hold
as primary objectives – certainty and clarity.
D. Legal Positivism: “Open Texture” and the
Need for Morality in Law?
Standing in stark contrast to Fuller’s Legal Formalism, professor
and renowned legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart, has identified “two
connected handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unambiguously and
in advance, some sphere of conduct by means of general standards to be
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 179.
Id.
See H.R. 3915 § 129B(a),(d) (2007); S. 2452 §§ 129B(d), 707(i) (2007).
See S. 2452 § 129B(b) (2007).
See S. 2452 § 129A(a) (2007).
Clinton Foreclosure Crisis Press Release, supra note 102.
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used without further official direction on particular occasions. The first
handicap is our relative ignorance of fact: the second is our relative indeterminacy of aim.” 137 Hart claims that these handicaps will prevent
Legal Formalism from ever attaining the “certainty” it seeks. Rather,
Hart argues that the law must be characterized by an “open texture”
(“Hart’s Open Texture”): 138
[A]ll [legal] systems, in different ways, compromise between two
social needs: the need for certain rules which can, over great areas of
conduct, safely be applied by private individuals to themselves
without fresh official guidance or weighing up of social issues, and
the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official
choice, issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled
139
when they arise in a concrete case.

Dismissing Fuller’s aspirations for certainty and clarity, Legal
Positivists may claim that the Reg Z amendments, the Miller Act and the
Reid Act, while creating new rules 140 and duties 141 in the marketplace,
satisfy Hart’s Open Texture test. Under Hart’s approach, then, the
federal government’s responses, even while failing to deliver strictly
concrete rules, rightfully constitute a “settlement by an informed,
official choice” 142 and exemplify “a need for the further exercise of
choice in the application of general rules to particular cases.” 143 Legal
Formalists may counter that the uncertainties introduced by the federal
government’s responses fail to uphold the law’s fundamental objective
of providing transparent rules upon which parties may rely. 144 Hart
claims, however, that the need to exercise such a choice is unavoidable.

137. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (Oxford Univ. Press Inc. 2d Ed.,
1961).
138. Id. at 127-28 (“Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the
communication of standards of behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the
great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their application is in question,
prove indeterminate; they will have what has been called an open texture.”).
139. HART, supra note 137, at 130.
140. Such as minimum debt-to-income ratios and mandatory verification of income.
See discussion supra Part II.B and Part II.C.
141. Such as new duties of care and liability for assignees of mortgages. See
discussion supra Part II.C.
142. HART, supra note 137, at 130.
143. Id. at 129.
144. See note 138 et seq. and corresponding text.
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Formalism, Hart asserts, “seeks to disguise and to minimize the need for
such choice, once the general rule has been laid down.” 145
Therefore, Positivists may direct Hart’s arguments at those who
oppose the federal government’s responses on certainty grounds,
claiming that the certainty argument fails to account for the need to
exercise further choice when unforeseen cases, or mounting foreclosures, present themselves. But if certainty and clarity are not the law’s
purpose – or at least not the law’s only purpose – what else is there?
While Hart’s Open Texture may be considered the backbone of
Legal Positivism, what Legal Positivism actually entails in practice has
been debated for decades. 146 The role of morality in determining what
the law is and what it ought to be has divided Legal Positivists into two
factions. 147 Inclusive, or Soft, Legal Positivism “accepts that moral
terms can be part of the necessary or sufficient criteria for legal validity
in a legal system, but insist[s] that the use of moral criteria is contingent
– and derived from the choices or actions of particular legal officials –
rather than part of the nature of law . . . .” 148 Hart acknowledged that his
doctrine “may incorporate as criteria of legal validity conformity with
moral principles or substantive values . . . .” and therefore may be
aligned with Soft Positivism. 149 Hard Legal Positivism, in contrast,
145. HART, supra note 137, at 129. Hart claims that Legal Formalism is an attempt
“to secure a measure of certainty or predictability at the cost of blindly prejudging what
is to be done in a range of future cases, about whose composition we are ignorant.” Id.
at 129-30.
146. Brian H. Bix, Legal Positivism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 31 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds.,
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005) (“[L]egal positivism’s distinctiveness and its point
have become more elusive, even as it has become more established with Englishlanguage analytical jurisprudence – perhaps because it has become more established in
analytical jurisprudence.”).
147. See Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Shore Guide for the
Perplexed, in RONALD DWORKIN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN FOCUS 23-50 (Arthur
Ripstein ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007); Bix, supra note 146, at 42-44 (citing
Ronald Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE, at 31-150, and Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, at 22-28).
148. Bix, supra note 146, at 38.
149. HART, supra note 137, at 250. Hart has also claimed that a penumbra of
uncertainty surrounds all legal rules, therefore application of a rule to specific cases in
the “penumbral area” cannot be a matter of logical deduction, but rather “The intelligent
decision of penumbral questions is one made not mechanically but in light of aims,
purposes, and policies though not necessarily in light of anything we would call moral
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holds that “moral criteria can be neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for the legal status of a norm.” 150 This split among Legal
Positivists introduces a critical question when considering the millions
of Americans facing foreclosure on homes they purchased but could not
afford: should morality considerations matter when determining the
propriety of the federal government’s responses? How might any of the
proposed federal regulations and legislation be defended on morality
grounds?
Of course, there will always be debate over what “morality”
means. 151 According to Hart, “[t]he equal extension to all of the fundamental legal protections of person and property is now generally regarded as an elementary requirement of the morality of political institutions, and the denial of these protections to innocent persons, as a
flagrant injustice.” 152 Thus, proponents of new disclosure requirements
in the Reg Z amendments 153 and proposed legislation 154 may assert that
the government’s responses, by requiring information to be disclosed
equally, achieve the moral aim of fairly protecting all parties’ interests.
However, Hart further asserts that “no man could regard as morally
acceptable the withholding from others, with needs and in circumstances
similar to his own, of those benefits which he would not wish to be
withheld from himself.” 155 Therefore, perhaps it is here, in the realm of
morality, that opponents may present the strongest argument against the
principles.” H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 64, 67-71
(Oxford Univ. Press 1983). Therefore, Hart argues that morality may be a factor in
deciding what the law ought to be, but is not necessarily always a factor.
150. Bix, supra note 146, at 36.
151. See, e.g., HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 149,
at 343-64.
152. Id. at 116. Even when equal protection is denied, Hart claims “lip service is often paid to the principle of equal distribution by the pretence that the persons
discriminated against are either criminal in intention, if not in deed, or are like children
who are incapable of benefiting from the freedom which laws confer and are in need of
some more paternalistic regime.” Id.
153. See 12 C.F.R. § 226, supra note 46 (limiting broker compensation to an amount
that does not exceed the amount the broker has agreed with the consumer in advance the
broker will receive).
154. See H.R. 3915 § 301, supra note 71.
155. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 149, at 117.
Hart continues, “If this principle is admitted, it follows that it cannot be a sufficient
moral ground for accepting legal arrangements that the advantages they give to some
outweigh the disadvantages for others.” Id.
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federal government’s calling for more than just added disclosure – not
because the responses would cause market participants to act inefficiently, but rather because the government’s responses are morally unfair and
unequal. The Frank-Dodd FHA Bills do not apply to all borrowers
equally. Instead, the bills would allow the FHA to offer lower interest
rates only to those borrowers who have failed to pay on time. 156 The
Clinton Plan 157 and the Obama Plan 158 do not profess to apply taxpayer
money equally across all homeowners, but rather only to those who are
“hardest-hit” and “innocent.” Is this fair? Do these responses, in
addition to introducing a “moral hazard” from an economic standpoint,
fail to achieve the purpose of law because they are morally unjust?
Josh Zinner, Co-Director of the Neighborhood Economic Development Advocacy Project (“NEDAP”), says absolutely not. Zinner
believes that the great profits Wall Street banks experienced over the last
five years by securitizing subprime loans (regardless of whether these
profits have now been wiped out) came at the expense of innocent, lowincome borrowers, many of whom come from minority communities and
were specifically targeted in a process known as “reverse redlining.” 159
Zinner claims that the federal government must respond with regulations
and legislation that simultaneously hold Wall Street banks accountable
and help distressed borrowers avoid foreclosure.
CONCLUSION
As usual, Mr. Buffett’s words have proven true. The tide has gone
out and the subprime fallout we continue to witness is both distressing
and nauseating. Republicans and Democrats, proponents of big government and small, homeowners struggling to make their monthly mortgage
payments and politicians answering to their constituencies continue to

156.
157.
158.
159.

See supra note 116.
See Clinton Stimulus Press Release, supra note 102.
See Obama Economic Agenda, supra note 107.
See Effects of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Efforts to Help Struggling
Homeowners: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and
Consumer Credit, 110th Cong. 89 (2008) (Statement of Josh Zinner, Co-Director,
Neighborhood Economic Development Advocacy Project) (“There was certainly never
any consideration in this process for the plight of borrowers – the mortgages which put
so many families at risk were commodified in such a way that they were seen as little
more than pork bellies to be traded and profited from.”).
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watch with a woeful eye. By illustrating that federal lawmakers may
now be operating under presumptions of what the law ought to be, this
Note asserts that such presumptions should be explicitly stated. Without
this information, important considerations in assessing the responses
may be blatantly overlooked or materially misunderstood. As a twentysix year-old, I hope to look back on this time and say, “Under the
leadership of my parents’ generation, we somehow found a way to deal
with this awful leech called Subprime. More importantly, we dealt with
it the right way.” And as I say these words, I do not think only about
“economic efficiency.” I hope I am not alone.

